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Inhibition of irrelevant information and response tendencies is a central characteristic of
conscious control and executive functions. However, recent theories in vision considered
Inhibition of Return (IOR: slower responses to attended than unattended positions) to be
a hallmark of automatic exogenous capture of visual attention by unconscious cues. In the
present study, we show that an unconscious cue that exogenously captures attention does
not lead to IOR. First of all, subliminal cues with a contrast different from a searched-for
target contrast capture attention independently of their match of contrast polarity to
the search criteria. This is found with a short cue-target interval (Exp. 1). However, the
same cues do not lead to IOR with a long cue-target interval. The lack of IOR is also
verified for several intermediate intervals (Exp. 2), for high-contrast cues and low-contrast
targets (Exp. 3), and with lower luminance cues presented on a CRT screen (Exp. 4).
Finally, no capture effect but IOR is found for consciously perceived anti-predictive cues
(Exp. 5). Together the results support the notion of a double dissociation between IOR and
exogenous capture and are in line with a decisive role of consciousness for inhibition.
Keywords: vision, attention, subliminal, cueing, inhibition of return, attentional capture, exogenous capture
INTRODUCTION
Conscious control allows inhibition of irrelevant information
(cf. Baars, 2002; Botvinick et al., 2004), but inhibition has also
been found with task-relevant unconscious stimuli (Lau and
Passingham, 1998). Recently, however,Mulckhuyse and Theeuwes
(2010) argued that Inhibition of Return (IOR) could be a hall-
mark of exogenous capture of visual attention by unconscious
cues. In this context, exogenous capture denotes attentional cap-
ture by a truly task-irrelevant stimulus, and IOR denotes that
participants respond slower to recently attended but now ignored
positions than to less attended positions (cf. Taylor and Klein,
1998). For example, presenting a cue with a cue-target Stimulus
Onset Asynchrony (SOA) of less than about 300ms at one of two
possible target positions, attentional capture to the cue is reflected
in facilitated responses to a target at the same position (SP) as the
cue. This facilitation is found relative to the responses to a target
at a different position (DP) than the cue. However, with SOAs of
more than about 300ms, this cueing effect reverses into IOR and
responses will often be slower in SP than DP conditions.
Mulckhuyse and Theeuwes (2010) argued that exogenous cap-
ture and IOR by unconscious cues are flip sides of one shared
process of initially activating and subsequently inhibiting one
cued location representation within the retinotopic map of the
Superior Colliculi, a midbrain structure that is fed by the visual
input of the magno-cellular projection from the retinal ganglion
cells. Support for this supposition comes from the observations
that the Superior Colliculi indeed seem to play an active role (I)
in exogenous capture (cf. Rafal et al., 1991) and (II) in uncon-
scious capture (cf. Ansorge, 2003; Fuchs and Ansorge, 2012) as
well as (III) in IOR (cf. Dorris et al., 2002).
However, it is also possible that exogenous capture and IOR
are brought about by dissociable cortical structures rather than
by one shared sub-cortical structure (e.g., Lupiánez, 2010; Hu
and Samuel, 2011). For example, exogenous capture (e.g., Itti
et al., 1998) and unconscious capture (e.g., Zhaoping, 2008) could
also rely on processing of visual input in early visual cortex (e.g.,
V1) whereas IOR could be brought about by a different corti-
cal area, for example, posterior parietal cortex (e.g., Mayer et al.,
2004; Toffanin et al., 2011). According to this line of reasoning,
it might well be that exogenous unconscious capture and IOR are
less tightly coupled to one another than assumed so that at least in
some instances exogenous unconscious capture could be observed
without subsequent IOR. This is of some relevance. If it can be
shown that unconscious exogenous capture and IOR are not flip
sides of one another, one could not rely on one of the effects,
for example, IOR, to infer with certainty that the other effect, for
example, exogenous capture, has also taken place. This, however,
is exactly the conclusion that has been drawn by Mulckhuyse and
Theeuwes (2010).
In addition, research with clearly visible cues has shown that
IOR is not only a consequence of exogenous attentional cap-
ture. To reiterate, exogenous capture can only be demonstrated
when the cue is truly irrelevant and does not fit to the top-down
control settings of the participants. However, IOR can also be
found after top-down contingent capture. For example, having
their participants search for either abrupt onset targets or color
targets, Gibson and Amelio (2000) demonstrated that abrupt
onset cues only captured attention and led to subsequent IOR if
the participants searched for abrupt onset targets. Capture and
IOR, however, were absent when an abrupt onset cue was used
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but targets were defined by colors. Gibson and Amelio (2000)
concluded that both, capture and IOR depended on a match
of the abrupt onset cues to the top-down control settings of
their participants which were set up to search for the targets (cf.
Folk et al., 1992; see also Pratt et al., 2001; Prinzmetal et al.,
2011).
This was the point of departure for the present study. We
wanted to test whether IOR is indeed a necessary consequence of
exogenous unconscious capture. Exogenous capture would only
be demonstrated where two conditions are fulfilled: visual cues
would have to (I) not match the participants’ top-down search
templates for relevant features and (II) be uninformative about
target positions (cf. Folk et al., 1992). Because criterion (I) must
not be met to find IOR (e.g., Gibson and Amelio, 2000) and
because Mulckhuyse et al. (2007) only used cues of a task-relevant
contrast polarity, it is possible that unconscious IOR reflected
top-down contingent capture based on a fit of the cue’s con-
trast polarity to the search settings rather than (a consequence
of) exogenous capture by a truly irrelevant cue. Therefore, it
still needs to be tested whether IOR is or is not a hallmark of
unconscious exogenous attentional capture.
In five Experiments, our participants reported the presence of
targets in unconsciously cued SP and DP conditions. Attentional
capture was verified as faster target detection in SP than DP con-
ditions with short SOAs (cf. McCormick, 1997). IOR was tested
as slower target detection in SP than DP conditions with long
cue-target SOAs. Crucially, we also varied whether or not the cues
matched the top-down search sets for contrast polarity. Our cues
either had the same contrast polarity as the searched-for targets,
or the cues had the opposite contrast polarity to the searched-
for targets. Thus, only the same- but not the opposite-polarity
cues matched the participants’ top-down search templates for
target contrasts. For example, if participants searched for dark
targets, dark cues were top-down matching but light cues were
non-matching. If it is true that IOR is a hallmark of unconscious
exogenous capture, we expected IOR in the non-matching con-
ditions with an opposite-polarity cue because it has been shown
that truly exogenous capture does not depend on a match of
the contrast polarity sign (Steinman et al., 1997). In the final
Experiment 5 we also tested attentional effects of anti-predictive
consciously and unconsciously perceived cues (cf. McCormick,
1997). If consciousness has a supportive role for inhibition, we
expected to find IOR with conscious cues even if it was lacking
with unconscious cues.
EXPERIMENTAL SECTION
EXPERIMENT 1
Methods
In Experiment 1 (with a TFTmonitor) eight participants searched
for black (23 cd/m2) and another eight for white (122 cd/m2) tar-
gets against a gray background (72.5 cd/m2, Weber contrast for
both targets was cw = ±0.68). Figure 1A depicts sample trials:
the cue (a ring of 3.0◦ × 3.0◦ size and of a strength of 0.25◦)
was presented left or right on the screen (with an eccentricity
of 6.7◦) 16ms before two placeholder rings (of the same size)
appeared: one in the middle and the other one on the opposite
side of the screen. The target was a disk (of 1.9◦ × 1.9◦ size) and
FIGURE 1 | (A) Depicted are schematic trials. The top row shows a dark
target on the right side, cued by a dark cue at the left side (same-polarity
and DP condition). The bottom row also depicts a dark target, but preceded
by a light cue and again on the different position (opposite-polarity and DP
condition). (B) Depicted are mean RTs (between 280 and 380ms) and
standard errors of the mean (error bars) of all participants, plotted
separately for the short (left panel) and long SOA (right panel) of Experiment
1. Results are shown for SP (left side of each panel) and DP conditions (right
side of each panel), and plotted separately for same- (solid lines) and
opposite-polarity cues (dashed lines). (C) Depicted are mean RTs (between
280 and 380ms) and standard errors of the mean (error bars) of all
participants, plotted separately for the five different SOAs (separate panels,
from left to right for SOA = 50, 100, 200, 300, and 700ms) of Experiment 2.
could appear either centered in the left or right ring. In the short
SOA condition, the target appeared along with the placehold-
ers. In the long SOA condition, the target was shown 1 s after
the onset of the two placeholder rings. The target was shown
in 80% of the trials. The cue and the targets were equally likely
left or right, and the target was equally often at the cued posi-
tion (SP condition) or opposite of the cue (DP condition). The
cue was, therefore, uninformative with respect to the target posi-
tion and the cue was also invisible (or hard to see) because of
strong flicker fusion with the placeholder onsets during the tiny
interval between the cue and the two other placeholder rings. For
every participant a same- or an opposite-polarity cue (with lumi-
nance values as for the respective targets) equally likely preceded
the target. Different conditions were presented in a randomized
sequence of 200 trials. To assess capture (in the short SOA) and
IOR (in the long SOA), participants reported the target’s presence
by a button press. After the target-detection task, participants
were informed that one of the rings (i.e., the cue) appeared one
frame earlier than the others, and instructed to report the cue
position. Participants pressed the left button if they saw the cue
on the left and the right button if they saw the cue on the right. In
this task, the participants’ unconsciousness about the cues would
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be reflected by a small d′ value, with d′ = 0 indicating chance
performance.
Results
Participants performed very well on the target-detection task
(mean d′ of target detection = 4.3). Only target-present trials
were included in the analyses, and trials with incorrect responses
(i.e., misses; 1.1%) and outliers [reaction times (RTs) deviat-
ing more than two standard deviations from the mean; 4.0%]
were excluded. See also Figure 1B for the RT results. A repeated-
measurements ANOVA of the mean correct RTs with the variables
cue position (SP vs. DP), cue contrast polarity (same vs. oppo-
site), and SOA (short vs. long) led to the following results.
Responses to targets preceded by an SP cue (327ms) were gen-
erally faster than in DP conditions (336ms), as indicated by
a main effect of cue position, F(1,15) = 13.6, p < 0.01, η2p =
0.48. Participants also responded faster in the long SOA (RT =
310ms) than the short SOA (RT = 353ms), as indicated by a
significant main effect of SOA: F(1,15) = 101.8, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.87, and in opposite- (RT = 328ms) than same-polarity (RT =
334ms) conditions, reflected in a main effect of contrast polarity,
F(1,15) = 8.5, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.36. Significant two-way interac-
tions between cue polarity and SOA, F(1,15) = 5.2, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.26, and between cue position and SOA F(1,15) = 22.7,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.60, prompted post-hoc Bonferroni-adjusted
t-tests of cueing effects (SP vs. DP) split up for each combination
of SOA and contrast polarity. Importantly, these tests revealed a
significant cueing effect in the short SOA for both, same-polarity
(SP: RT = 352ms, DP: RT = 365ms, p < 0.01) and opposite-
polarity conditions (SP: RT = 337ms, DP: RT = 358ms, p <
0.01). In the long SOA, no significant effect was found, neither
for same-polarity (SP: RT = 308ms, DP: RT = 312ms, p = 0.19)
nor opposite-polarity conditions (SP: RT = 312ms, DP: RT =
308ms, p = 0.50).
After finishing the target-detection task, participants were
asked whether they had been aware of the cue (i.e., one of the
rings starting earlier) during the target-detection task. All par-
ticipants reported a subjective unawareness of the cues during
the target-detection task. However, as an objective measure of
cue awareness, we next ran a cue-discrimination task, and d′ for
cue detection was calculated from this task. To be precise, in
the cue-discrimination task, correct reports of cues on the right
counted as hits, and incorrect reports of cues on the right as
false alarms, and d′ was calculated as the difference between the
z-transformed probabilities of the hits minus the z-transformed
probabilities of the false alarms. d′ will be zero in the case of
chance performance (or invisibility of the cues) and can infinitely
increase with an ever increasing discrimination performance. On
average, cue detection was above chance level [mean d′ = 0.24,
t-test against zero, t(15) = 2.5, p = 0.024]. However, restricting
our analysis to only the worst cue discriminators among the par-
ticipants, the participants remained completely unaware of the
cue [mean d′ = −0.02, t(7) = −0.55, p = 0.60], and yet the RT
effects reported above could be replicated, with significant main
effects for cue position and SOA, and a significant interaction
between these variables reflecting that there was a cueing effect in
the short SOA (p < 0.01) but no IOR in the long SOA (p = 0.27).
Discussion
We found cueing effects in the short SOA for both, same-
and opposite-polarity conditions. This is evidence for exogenous
capture because only in the same- but not in the opposite-
polarity conditions, the cues would have matched the top-down
search template for target contrasts. In addition, exogenous cap-
ture was also found with the participants that remained unaware
of the cues. This demonstrated exogenous unconscious cap-
ture. Crucially, however, we could not find any evidence of
IOR in the long SOAs. This finding is at variance with the
claim that IOR is a hallmark of unconscious exogenous capture.
Before we could conclude this with certainty, additional pos-
sible explanations for the lack of IOR had to be tested. First,
the long SOA of 1 s could have been an unfortunate choice, if
IOR occurred earlier and had vanished after 1 s. To test this
possibility, we conducted Experiment 2, where we used five inter-
mediate SOAs between 50 and 700ms. Second, the luminance
values of our stimuli and background were different to pre-
vious studies that reported IOR (cf. Mulckhuyse et al., 2007).
This might be crucial because lower target contrasts can lead
to larger IOR compared to higher contrasts (e.g., Hunt and
Kingstone, 2003). This was tested in Experiment 3. Third, the
current Experiment differed in two further respects from the
study by Mulckhuyse et al. (2007): the use of a CRT screen and
the cues’ luminance values. These changes were addressed in
Experiment 4.
EXPERIMENT 2
Methods
With 18 new participants, we used the same experimental set up
as in Experiment 1, except for the SOAs that were 50, 100, 200,
300, or 700ms, presented in a random order.
Results and discussion
Participants performed very well on the target-detection task
(mean d′ = 4.2). Again, only target-present trials were analyzed,
and trials with incorrect responses (2.1%) and outlying RTs (fur-
ther 2.3%) were excluded. For the RT results see Figure 1C. A
repeated-measurements ANOVA of themean correct RTs with the
variables cue position (SP vs. DP), cue contrast polarity (same vs.
opposite), and SOA (five steps) led to a significant main effect of
SOA, F(4,68) = 11.2, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.40 (for SOA of 50ms:
RT = 329ms, SOA of 100ms: RT = 309ms, SOA of 200ms: RT=
304ms, SOA of 300ms: RT = 303ms, and SOA of 700ms: RT =
333ms). All other tests failed to reach significance.
All participants reported a subjective unawareness of the cues
during the target-detection task, but the cue detection-block
revealed above chance accuracy for the shortest and longest SOA
(mean d′s = 0.35 and 0.44 respectively, p < 0.05), whereas the
cue remained below the objective threshold in the other SOAs
(all ps > 0.05).
Discussion
In Experiment 2 we used the exact same procedure as in
Experiment 1 except for the SOAs. Although the cues initially cap-
tured attention (at a very short SOA of Exp. 1), the capture effect
seems to wear off very rapidly, as indicated by non-significant
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effects for all SOAs in Experiment 2. This result also rules out
the possibility that IOR occurred at an earlier interval between
50 and 700ms.
EXPERIMENT 3
In Experiment 3, we tested whether IOR depended on contrast
strength. In past research it was found that lower target contrasts
can lead to larger IOR compared to higher target contrasts (e.g.,
Hunt and Kingstone, 2003). For our tests, we used high-contrast
cues preceding low-contrast targets at four different SOAs.
Methods
With 14 new participants, we used a similar experimental set up
as in Experiment 1. Here, all participants searched for a low-
contrast target (10.5 cd/m2, Weber contrast cw = 0.62) preceded
by a high-contrast cue (104 cd/m2, Weber contrast cw = 15.0)
against a black background (6.5 cd/m2). The reported luminance
values match those used in the study by Hunt and Kingstone
(2003). Furthermore, we also varied the SOAs: In half of the tri-
als, the target again appeared simultaneously with the two other
placeholders, whereas in the other half of the trials the target fol-
lowed equally often after an SOA of 800, 1,000, or 1,200ms. The
additional long SOAs of 800 and 1,200ms were chosen corre-
sponding to the study by Hunt and Kingstone (2003; where the
interval between cue and target onset was 1,160ms, and between
cue offset and target onset 860ms). The target again appeared
equally often at the same (SP) or different position (DP) as the
cue. Conditions were presented in a randomized sequence of 240
trials including 20% catch trials. Cue visibility was assessed in a
second block consisting of 60 trials.
Results
Participants performed well in the target-detection task even
though the target was difficult to see (mean d′ = 2.1). Again,
only target-present trials were analyzed, and trials with incor-
rect responses (20.7%) and outlying RTs (4.4%) were excluded.
See Figure 2A for the RT results. First, we tested for IOR in
FIGURE 2 | (A) Depicted are the results (mean RTs between 350 and
550ms) of Experiment 3. Mean RT was faster if the cue was at the same
position (SP) as the target than if the cue was at a different position (DP)
than the target. This was found with a short cue-target stimulus onset
asynchrony (SOA; solid line) but not with a long SOA (dashed line). (B)
Analogous results (mean RTs between 325 and 425ms) of Experiment 4
are plotted separately for the short (solid line) and long SOAs (dashed line),
for three different conditions separately (see figure legend). For further
details refer to the Methods sections of Experiments 3 and 4.
only the long SOAs, and calculated a repeated-measurements
ANOVA with the variables cue position (SP vs. DP), and SOA
(800, 1,000, or 1,200ms) on RTs. There was neither a significant
main effect of SOA nor cue position, nor a significant inter-
action between these variables (all ps > 0.18). Therefore, we
collapsed across different long SOAs for a subsequent ANOVA,
with the variables cue position (SP vs. DP), and SOA (short vs.
long) on RTs. Again we found a significant main effect for SOA,
F(1,13) = 63.1, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.83, indicating faster responses
in the long SOAs (RT = 377ms) than in the short SOA (RT =
510ms). A significant interaction between cue position and SOA,
F(1,13) = 7.7, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.37, and post-hoc Bonferroni-
adjusted t-tests revealed a significant cueing effect in the short
SOA (SP: RT = 504ms, DP: RT = 516ms, p < 0.05) and no
effect in the long SOAs (SP: RT = 377ms, DP: RT = 376ms,
p = 0.94).
Importantly, again, all participants reported a subjective
unawareness of the cues during the target-detection task.
Objectively, participants performed above chance level in the cue-
detection task (mean d′ = 1.65, p < 0.001), and performance did
not differ across SOAs, F(3,39) < 1.
Discussion
When presenting a low-contrast target cued by a high-contrast
cue, we failed to find IOR in the long SOAs, although we found
a cueing effect in the short SOA. This finding rules out that
the lack of IOR in the present Experiment 1 could be explained
by the high contrast strength of the target relative to the back-
ground, which facilitated target perception and undermined the
attentional effect of the cues.
The results of Experiment 3 also prompted a question: because
target- and cue-detection were both objectively, and almost
equally bad, does this mean that the participants were unaware
of the low-contrast targets? Not necessarily. During the target-
detection task, participants actively searched for the targets.
Although active top-down search for a stimulus does not always
lead to stimulus awareness (e.g., Ansorge et al., 2009), a wealth of
research suggests that active search for a stimulus has the poten-
tial to increase stimulus awareness (cf. Mack and Rock, 1998;
Simons, 2000). Therefore, our participants probably saw the tar-
gets but failed to subjectively see the cues during target-detection
because they actively searched for only the targets. By the same
token, the participants probably became increasingly aware of the
cues during cue-detection, when they actively searched for the
cues. In line with this, participants indeed occasionally reported
becoming also subjectively aware of the cues during the cue-
detection task. In conclusion, we can understand that during
target-detection the participants were aware of the targets and
at the same time unaware of the cues, if we take into account
the awareness-mediating role of target-directed vs. cue-directed
active search.
EXPERIMENT 4
Experiment 4 was conducted on a CRT screen and participants
searched for three different target contrasts in three separate
blocks: black targets, white targets, and targets matching the
luminance conditions reported in Mulckhuyse et al. (2007).
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Methods
Experiment 4 used the same procedures as Experiment 1, except
for the following changes: A CRT monitor (as in Mulckhuyse
et al., 2007) was used instead of a TFT screen. All participants
(N = 18) searched for three different target luminances in three
separate blocks (with different block orders balanced across par-
ticipants): one block with black (20 cd/m2) targets against a gray
background (55 cd/m2; Weber contrast cw = −0.8), one with
white (90 cd/m2) targets against the same gray background (cw =
+0.8)—in these blocks, a cue of either the same or the opposite
contrast polarity preceded the target,—and a third block with tar-
gets and backgrounds with the same luminance values as reported
in Mulckhuyse et al. [i.e., a target in dark-gray (13 cd/m2) against
a black background (5 cd/m2), cw = 1.6]. The latter condition
will henceforth be referred to as the “Mulckhuyse condition.”
In this condition, only cues matching the target luminance were
used. In all blocks, the target was either presented along with the
other placeholders (SOA = 0ms) or with an SOA of 1 s. Again,
participants searched for the targets in a random sequence of all
conditions within each block of 200 trials.
Results
Participants performed very well on the target-detection task
(mean d′ = 4.7). Again, only target-present trials were ana-
lyzed, and trials with incorrect responses (1.1%) and outlying
RTs (2.7%) were excluded. See Figure 2B for the RT results. A
repeated measurements ANOVA of the mean correct RTs with the
variables cue position (SP vs. DP), cue condition (same-polarity vs.
opposite-polarity vs. Mulckhuyse condition), and SOA (short vs.
long) led to a significant main effect for SOA, F(1,17) = 54.0, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.76, with shorter RTs in the long (RT= 346ms) than
in the short SOA (RT = 381ms). Furthermore, responses in SP
conditions (RT = 357ms) were generally faster than in DP con-
ditions (RT = 371ms), as indicated by a significant main effect
of cue position, F(1,17) = 185.1, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.92. Also,
responses in the Mulckhuyse condition were generally slower
(RT = 378ms) compared to the same- (RT = 358ms, p < 0.001)
and opposite-polarity condition (RT = 355ms, p < 0.001), indi-
cated by a main effect for cue condition, F(2,34) = 46.2, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.73. We found significant interactions between cue
condition and cue position, F(2,34) = 5.4, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.24,
between cue condition and SOA, F(2,34) = 7.1, p < 0.01, η2p =
0.30, and between cue position and SOA, F(1,17) = 82.4, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.83. Post-hoc Bonferroni adjusted t-tests revealed
significant cueing effects (i.e., faster responses to SP than DP cued
targets) for all cue conditions in the short SOA (RT differences,
i.e., RTs to DP cues – SP cues: for same-polarity = 34ms, for
opposite-polarity = 19ms, and for the Mulckhuyse condition =
28ms, all ps < 0.001). No significant results were found for the
long SOA at all (RT differences, i.e., RTs to SP cues – DP cues: for
same-polarity = –6ms, for opposite-polarity = 1ms, and for the
Mulckhuyse condition = 0ms, all ps > 0.09), indicating a lack of
IOR in all conditions.
Importantly, again, all participants reported a subjective
unawareness of the cues during the target-detection task. Also,
although objective cue detection was worse in the Mulckhuyse
condition (mean d′ = 1.32) than in the same-polarity (mean
d′ = 1.98; p < 0.05) and the opposite-polarity condition (mean
d′ = 2.21; p < 0.01), participants performed above chance level
in all conditions (all ps> 0.001).
Discussion
Experiment 4 showed that capture can be found even with cues
that are subjectively not seen but that IOR is not observed under
these conditions. These findings rule out that the CRT screen or
the different luminance values of the cues and backgroundused in
the study by Mulckhuyse et al. (2007) as compared to the present
Experiments 1–3 accounted for the absence of IOR in the cur-
rent study. Experiment 4 is a failure to replicate IOR under the
conditions of Mulckhuyse et al. (2007).
EXPERIMENT 5
In Experiment 5, we tested whether IOR occurs for anti-predictive
supraliminal cues. This manipulation allows for a strategic use of
the cues (cf. McCormick, 1997; Ansorge, Kiss et al., 2011). Since
the target can be found at the position opposite to the cue (i.e.,
in the DP conditions) in the majority of the trials, we expected
faster responses to DP than SP conditions, when the cues were
visible, but not for invisible cues. In the Introduction, we argued
for a critical role of consciousness during inhibition. Therefore, in
two separate blocks the cues were either rendered visible or invis-
ible, and they appeared at the position opposite to the target on
the majority of trials. We expected a qualitative difference. Based
on the supportive role of consciousness for inhibition IOR was
expected in supraliminal cueing conditions. Based on the lack of
IOR in the preceding experiments of the present study, however,
no IOR was expected in the subliminal cueing conditions.
Methods
With 16 new participants, we used a similar experimental set up
as in Experiment 1, except for the following changes. First, in two
separate blocks, the cues were either invisible (as in the preceding
experiments) or visible. Cue visibility was achieved in one block
by omitting the two additional placeholder rings (see Figure 3A).
Block sequence was balanced across participants. Second, targets
were preceded by DP cues in 75% and by SP cues in only 25%
of the target-present trials. In this manner, IOR was encouraged.
FIGURE 3 | (A) Depicted are schematic trials of Experiment 5. The top row
shows a visibly cued dark target (same-polarity and SP condition). The
bottom row depicts an invisibly cued light target (opposite-polarity and DP
condition). (B) Results (mean RTs between 330 and 430ms) of Experiment
5 are plotted separately for the short (left panel) and long SOA (right panel),
and for visibly (solid line) and invisibly cued targets (dashed line).
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Different conditions were presented in a randomized sequence of
240 trials including 20% catch trials. Cue awareness was assessed
in a final block consisting of 80 trials.
Results
Participants performed very well on the target-discrimination
task (mean d′ = 4.1). Again, only target-present trials were ana-
lyzed, and trials with incorrect responses (1.9%) and outlying
RTs (2.8%) were excluded. See Figure 3B for the RT results. A
repeated-measurements ANOVA with the variables cue position
(SP vs. DP), cue contrast polarity (same vs. different), cue visi-
bility (visible vs. invisible), and SOA (short vs. long) on mean
correct RTs led to the following results. Responses in SP condi-
tions (RT = 385ms) were generally slower than in DP conditions
(RT = 364ms), as indicated by a significant main effect of cue
position, F(1,15) = 41.7, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.74. Furthermore,
participants generally responded faster in the long SOA (RT =
362ms) compared to the short SOA (RT = 387ms), as indi-
cated by a significant main effect for SOA, F(1,15) = 15.5, p <
0.01, η2p = 0.51. We found four significant two-way interactions:
between cue position and contrast polarity, F(1,15) = 5.9, p <
0.05, η2p = 0.28, between cue position and awareness, F(1,5) =
46.1, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.76, between cue position and SOA,
F(1,15) = 22.2, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.60, and between awareness
and SOA, F(1,15) = 49.9, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.77. Importantly,
post-hoc Bonferroni-adjusted t-tests revealed a cueing effect (SP:
RT = 392ms, DP: RT = 408ms, p < 0.05) in the invisible condi-
tion for the short SOA, whereas participants responded slower to
SP (RT = 389ms) compared to DP cues (RT = 360ms, p < 0.01)
when the cue was visible. In the long SOA, we again found no
significant effect for invisible cues (SP: RT = 349ms, DP: RT =
343ms, p = 0.36), and IOR for visible cues (SP: RT = 411ms, DP:
RT = 345ms, p < 0.001).
Cue detection was worse for invisible cues (mean d′ = 1.92)
than for visible cues (mean d′ = 3.51; p < 0.01), but partici-
pants performed above chance level in both conditions (both
ps> 0.001).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 5 show a double dissociation between
cueing effects and IOR: for anti-predictive visible cues IOR but
no capture was found, whereas for unconscious or invisible cues
a capture effect but no IOR was obtained (cf. McCormick, 1997).
This emphasizes that IOR and exogenous capture are based on
two separatemechanisms, mediated by conscious control or being
more independent of control, respectively. With the visible cues,
IOR was even found with the short SOA, which is in line with
prior findings (cf. Tassinari and Berlucchi, 1993). One caveat of
the present experiment is that the visual stimulation in the vis-
ible and invisible condition cannot be directly compared. For
instance, the placeholders could have undermined capture and
IOR only in the unconscious cueing conditions. Evidently, this
was not the case regarding capture because capture was only
found in the invisible conditions with the additional placehold-
ers. However, future research should be devoted to understand
the confounded roles of invisibility and placeholders on the lack
of IOR, too.
A second important aspect of the results of Experiment 5
is that the subliminal cues used throughout this study were
truly subliminal because if participants would have been aware
of the cues, their strategic use for inhibition would have led
to faster responses in DP than SP conditions in the subliminal
condition, too.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We found attentional capture by unconscious cues. This was
reflected in faster target detection in SP than DP conditions in
the short cue-target interval for both, same- and opposite-polarity
conditions (Exp. 1), and these effects did not differ for very low-
contrast targets (Exp. 3) or varying luminance values of cues or
targets (Exp. 4). In contrast to some previous research (cf. Ansorge
et al., 2010), we observed subliminal attentional capture that was
independent of the match of the cue to the searched-for target
features (here: target contrast polarities). Thus, exogenous capture
by the cueswas ensured at least in theopposite-polarity conditions.
In the current studywe found an independence of the cueing effect
from the match between the contrast polarity of the unconscious
cue and the participants’ search set.
Crucially, however, and in line with our opinion that IOR is
not a hallmark of unconscious exogenous capture, we did not
find IORwith longer cue-target SOAs (see alsoMcCormick, 1997;
Scharlau et al., 2006). This was found even when different inter-
mediate SOAs were used (Exp. 2). Therefore, the lack of IOR was
very likely not due to an unfortunate choice of SOAs. In addi-
tion, because we found exogenous capture with the same cues
under short SOA conditions (in Exp. 1), the lack of IOR cannot
be ascribed to an absence of attentional capture. Finally, whether
or not the cues were relevant did not change this major result.
Crucially, IOR but no capture was found in a control condition
with consciously perceived cues (Exp. 5). Together, these results
support the conclusion that capture and IOR do not necessarily
rely on the same mechanism (cf. Prinzmetal et al., 2011), and
must not be brought about by one shared two-phase process
in the Superior Colliculi (cf. Mulckhuyse and Theeuwes, 2010).
Instead, the fact that capture could be observed without subse-
quent IOR would be equally well in line with different origins
of capture and IOR, for instance, an origin of capture in the
early visual cortex (cf. Zhaoping, 2008) and an origin of IOR in
posterior parietal cortex (cf. Toffanin et al., 2011).
Unexpectedly and in contrast to Mulckhuyse et al. (2007), our
participants were able to objectively discriminate between the
cues as indicated by significant d′ values. This was the case even
in conditions that were very similar in all important respects to
the protocol of Mulckhuyse et al. (2007; present Exp. 4). Maybe
some characteristic such as the exact shape of the cues (which
were rings in our study but disks in Mulckhuyse et al., 2007) has
led to a lower visibility in Mulckhuyse et al. (2007) study but our
results are well in accordance with the known sensitivity of the
visual system for temporal asynchronies between unconsciously
cued and uncued stimuli (cf. Scharlau and Ansorge, 2003).
Note also that the currently found average ability of the par-
ticipants to objectively discriminate between the cues does not
cast doubts on our conclusion that we measured an unconscious
capture effect. This is so because first, in Experiment 1, we showed
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very similar capture effects in objectively unconscious and con-
scious cueing conditions, that is, for participants that performed
on chance level when discriminating the cues, a capture effect
in the short SOA and no IOR in the long SOA was found, too.
In addition, due to flicker fusion all of our participants failed
to see the cues and therefore claimed to at least subjectively
have remained unaware of the cues. All participants, therefore,
passed a subjective criterion of unconscious cueing during tar-
get detection and this alone allows the conclusion that cueing
was brought about unconsciously (Merikle et al., 2001). Crucially,
the participants’ inability of a strategic use of the anti-predictive
unconscious cues clearly showed that the subliminal cues used in
the present study were not consciously perceived (Exp. 5).
CONCLUSION
IOR can be found with visible and top-down matching cues
(cf. Gibson and Amelio, 2000) and IOR is unreliable with uncon-
scious exogenous capture (see our experiments above). Together,
these observations are in line with a double dissociation between
IOR on the one hand and unconscious exogenous capture on the
other. The results are also suggestive of a decisive role of task sets
and consciousness for inhibition in general and, thus, in good
agreement with major theories of inhibitory executive functions
(cf. Kunde, 2003; Botvinick et al., 2004; Ansorge, Fuchs et al.,
2011). For instance, using conscious and unconscious cueing,
IOR was stronger with conscious cues and sometimes selectively
found with conscious cues (cf. Ivanoff and Klein, 2003). It is our
opinion that the unreliable IOR effects of unconscious cues that
have sometimes been reported in the literature (Mulckhuyse et al.,
2007) could well be due to side factors unrelated to (I) the invis-
ibility of the cues and (II) the nature of capture (i.e., whether
capture was exogenous or not), such as the exact way in which
the cue visibility has been reduced (cf. Ivanoff and Klein, 2003)
or even the exact sample of participants (cf. Mulckhuyse et al.,
2007). The absence of IOR after unconscious exogenous cueing
in the present study certainly refutes Mulckhuyse and Theeuwe’s
(2010) assumption that IOR would be a hallmark of unconscious
exogenous capture.
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